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Abstract
Motivation: Budget support is the form of aid most commonly associ-
ated with recipient-country ownership. However, a number of scholars and 
practitioners have criticized the approach as masking new forms of condi-
tionality. Was budget support simply a guise for increasing donor influence 
in recipient countries? How can we explain the rapid shift towards budget 
support, as well as the rapid decline in its popularity after only a few years?
Purpose: We use a bargaining framework to explain the rise and fall of 
budget support. Contrary to explanations that suggest that budget support was 
a normative decision by donors designed to increase aid effectiveness by fos-
tering ownership, a bargaining framework emphasizes that aid policy is the 
result of sustained negotiations between donors and recipients. These negotia-
tions, however, are constrained by donors’ inability to deliver aid as promised.
Approach: We use a Nash bargaining framework to formalize the pre-
dictions of a bargaining model. From the model, two testable predictions 
emerge: (1) in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient govern-
ments are willing to selectively offer donor agencies greater access to and 
influence over domestic policy decision-making; and (2) in exchange for 
such influence, donor agencies are willing to exert less pressure on recipi-
ents to be politically inclusive. We then test the implications of the model 
using case-study evidence from Rwanda and Tanzania.
Findings: The empirical data, based on over 80 interviews with practi-
tioners over several periods of research in both countries, provide substan-
tial evidence in support of the model’s core assumptions and predictions. 
Contrary to claims that budget support increased recipient-country owner-
ship, interviews (identified as personal communications) suggest that, in 
exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments were 
willing to grant donors greater access and influence. In return, donor agen-
cies reduced demands on the recipient government regarding political in-
clusivity, tacitly accepting arrangements that centralized decision-making 
and excluded civil society. When donor agencies could no longer provide 
budget support as promised, these negotiated arrangements broke down.
Policy Implications: The findings challenge a common narrative that 
donors embraced budget support because of a normative commitment to 
ownership. They also demonstrate the value of a bargaining framework. 
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the century, a number of donors began advocating for budget support on the grounds that 
it would foster greater recipient-country ownership (Armon, 2007; Dijkstra, 2013; Orth et al., 2017).1 
Budget support is a type of medium-term programme aid provided directly to a recipient government’s 
budget, allowing recipients to use their own financial management systems and budget procedures 
(Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006, p. 5). Once distributed, budget support becomes indistinguishable from 
other types of government revenue. Therefore, the aid modality arguably allows recipient countries 
more control over how aid is spent.
Yet, rather than fostering recipient-country ownership, budget support has been critiqued as simply 
masking new forms of conditionality and increasing donor influence in recipient countries (i.e. de 
Renzio, 2006; Hayman, 2011a; Swedlund, 2013b). This raises the question of whether budget support 
was simply a guise for increasing donor control over aid funds. How can we explain the rapid shift 
towards budget support, as well as the rapid decline in its popularity after only a few short years?
In this article, we draw on a bargaining framework to help explain the rise and fall of budget sup-
port. A bargaining approach emphasizes the need to break open what Bourguignon and Sundberg 
(2007) call the “black box” of aid policy bargaining between donor agencies and recipient-country 
governments. Rather than assuming that decisions about aid delivery are donor driven, a bargaining 
framework stresses that aid policy is the result of sustained negotiations between donors and recipi-
ents (Whitfield, 2009; Whitfield & Fraser, 2010). According to Swedlund (2017), these negotiations 
are frequently undermined by donor commitment problems; recipient governments are unsure if 
donors will actually disburse aid as promised. Since both sides are aware of this problem, donors 
and recipients are constantly seeking out new institutional innovations—like budget support—in 
order to reduce donor commitment problems and foster more sustainable aid policy compromises. 
However, if these new institutional innovations do not actually solve commitment problems over 
the long term, these compromises will eventually break down and the aid modalities will fall out of 
favour.
We formalize the predictions of a bargaining approach using a simple Nash bargaining framework. 
In the model, donors and recipients bargain over three things: the volume of aid transfers, the amount 
of public spending that conforms to the donors’ policy preferences, and how much donors pressure 
governments to be politically inclusive. We then introduce a parameter that captures the extent to 
which recipient governments discount aid promises to account for donor commitment problems. From 
the model, two testable predictions emerge: (1) in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient 
governments are willing to selectively offer donor agencies greater access and influence over domestic 
 1Ownership is a contested concept (Faust, 2010). Consistent with the other articles in this special issue, we define ownership, 
as “ownership as control” or “the degree of control recipient governments are able to secure over implemented policy 
outcomes” (Whitfield, 2009, p. 4).
To understand why particular forms of aid, like budget support, rise in 
popularity only to quickly fall by the wayside, we need to understand what 
donor agencies and recipient governments bargain over and why.
K E Y W O R D S
budget support, donor–government relations, foreign aid, negotiation, 
ownership
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policy decision-making; and (2) in exchange for such influence, donor agencies are willing to exert 
less pressure on recipients to be politically inclusive.
We test these predictions using case-study evidence from Rwanda and Tanzania. Drawing on over 
80 interviews with principal decision-makers on both the donor and recipient-government side, we 
look at the rise and fall of budget support as a popular aid modality in both countries. The empiri-
cal data provides substantial evidence in support of the model’s core assumptions and predictions. 
Respondents in both countries not only frequently mentioned donor commitment problems as a key 
source of frustration for the recipient government, but also used these frustrations to justify their pref-
erence for budget support. Donors also reported believing that providing budget support gave them 
greater access to government decision-making processes and a strategic advantage with the recipient 
government. In return for such influence, respondents reported that donor agencies reduced demands 
on the government regarding political inclusivity, tacitly accepting arrangements that centralized de-
cision-making and excluded civil society. Consistent with the model, when donor agencies could no 
longer provide budget support as promised, these negotiated arrangements broke down.
The findings emphasize that aid policy is the result of negotiation between donor agencies and 
recipient countries. In these negotiations, donors frequently struggle to make credible commitments. 
Institutional innovations—like budget support—that promise to help with donor commitment prob-
lems open up the possibility for new aid policy compromises. However, these aid modalities will be 
unsustainable unless they are able to actually solve donor commitment problems over the long term. 
Rather than being driven by some normative commitment to ownership, the adoption of budget sup-
port was the result of an aid policy compromise between donor agencies and recipient countries. This 
compromise, however, was ultimately unsustainable, because donors were in the end unable to deliver 
aid as promised.
2 |  THE RISE AND FALL OF BUDGET SUPPORT AS 
POPULAR AID MODALITY
In 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched an ambitious pro-
gramme called the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The goal was to provide debt 
relief and low-interest loans to low- and middle-income countries. Originally, HIPC was strongly 
conditional. However, towards the end of the decade, there was a sudden and surprising change in the 
rhetoric about conditionality. In 1999, HIPC was reformed to include the requirement that participants 
draft a poverty-reduction strategy paper (PRSP) (Mosley, Chiripanhua, Grugel, & Thirkell-White, 
2012). The goal was to ensure that recipient countries had in place the proper policies for aid to be 
effective—without the heavy hand of conditionality.
By 2005, poverty-reduction strategy credits (PRSC), the funding mechanism for World Bank PRSP-
based lending, accounted for almost 60% of policy-based lending from the International Development 
Association (IDA) and a quarter of the World Bank’s total policy-based lending (World Bank, 2010, 
p. xi). Other donors followed suit and began providing what is now referred to as budget support. In 
2002, AidData estimated that donors disbursed USD 98.6 billion in budget support worldwide, up 
almost tenfold from USD 11.5 billion in 1990 (AidData, n.d.; Tierney et al., 2011).
Budget support was particularly favoured by a group of so-called “like-minded” donors, including 
the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, among which a consensus 
emerged that sustained poverty action requires effective governments that are accountable to their 
people. Therefore, aid should explicitly avoid approaches that undermine accountability and owner-
ship (Lawson et al., 2003, p. 26). Proponents of budget support argued that the approach was a way 
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to overcome past failures, because aid was explicitly linked to the governments’ own priorities (via 
PSRPs). At the same time, the aid modality provided a way to quickly scale up funding to support the 
achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were approved in 2000. Rather than 
having to design and implement a number of new programmes and projects, donors could quickly off-
load large amounts of aid via direct cash transfers.
Like previous development fads, however, the excitement around budget support did not last. 
Despite considerable efforts on the part of donors to build structures that would support its implemen-
tation, over the course of the late 2000s budget support totals began to dip globally. In response to the 
global financial crises, austerity measures were enacted and many European countries elected more 
conservative governments that were less favourable to budget support (and aid in general). By 2013, the 
total volume of budget support was down to just over USD 10 billion annually (Tierney et al., 2011).
The shift towards and away from budget support is interesting, because the aid modality always 
entailed a substantial risk for donors (Molenaers et al., 2010). There is some evidence that donors give 
more programme aid to better-governed countries (Clist et al., 2012; Morrissey, 2015). The evidence 
is far from conclusive, however. Once disbursed, there is also little evidence that budget support is 
more effective than project aid (Easterly, 2007; IDD and Associates, 2006; Koeberle et al., 2006; De 
Renzio, 2006). Budget support requires donor agencies to entrust aid to governments that are often 
anything but democratic; often fail to implement pro-poor policies; have weak institutional capacity; 
and may have engaged in corrupt and/or neo-patrimonial practices in the not so distant past (Faust, 
2010). Given donors’ interests in safeguarding their taxpayers’ money, why were they willing to re-
lease funds into the coffers of foreign governments?
The narrative regarding budget support suggests that its adoption was driven by aid effectiveness 
concerns, and in particular the need for more “country ownership.” Budget support is the aid modality 
most commonly associated with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Armon, 2007), and the 
approach continues to be justified on the grounds that it offers recipient countries more ownership 
over where aid dollars are spent (Orth et al., 2017). Empirically, however, there is little reason to as-
sume that the adoption of budget support was driven, at least exclusively, by a normative commitment 
to recipient-country ownership.
First, as early as the 1960s, there was a strong normative push for increasing “ownership” over 
development policy (Pearson, 1969). It was not until the early 2000s, however, that donors began em-
bracing the principle and advocating budget support. Why only then? Moreover, as this Special Issue 
makes clear, donor agencies did not stop believing in ownership as budget support totals declined. 
Rather, an active and lively debate continues over the concept.
Second, in practice, budget support has been critiqued as being a new form of conditionality used 
strategically by donors to gain more leverage over recipients (i.e. de Renzio, 2006; Hayman, 2011; 
Knoll, 2008; Swedlund, 2013b). Discussing Uganda and Tanzania, Harrison (2004), for example, 
notes the development of what he refers to as “postconditionality,” or a practice by which donors 
eschew the more arms-length conditionality of the past, in favour of being more closely involved in 
policy-making. He argues that budget support and related endeavours allow this type of close engage-
ment, because they allow donors to become intimately involved in fiscal processes. In the Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu, Dornan (2017) argues that donors have used budget support to leverage 
specific policy reforms.
How, then, can we explain the dramatic rise and fall in the popularity of budget support? Donor 
preferences (and constraints) undoubtedly play a role in explaining individual donor’s choices in aid 
modalities (Dietrich, 2013; Faust & Koch, 2014; Knack, 2014). They cannot, however, explain the 
sudden rise in the popularity of budget support at this particular point in time, nor its dramatic decline. 
Certain donors may be ideologically predisposed to provide aid through recipient-country systems, 
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but this fails to explain the dramatic rise in the popularity of budget support in the 2000s. It also fails 
to explain why its popularity plummeted in the late 2000s.
3 |  AID POLICY BARGAINING
In this article, we draw on a bargaining framework to provide a more nuanced account of why budget 
support rose in popularity at the turn of the century, only to be quickly abandoned a few years later. In 
a broad sense, a bargaining framework suggests that all aid is negotiated (Whitfield, 2009; Whitfield 
& Fraser, 2010; Swedlund, 2017). Rather than assuming that aid is donor driven, the approach means 
opening the black box of bargaining and negotiation between donor agencies and recipient countries 
(Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007).
In these negotiations, donor agencies use the promise of aid to exert influence over domestic policy 
reform. Given that aid is fungible, donor agencies wish to have a say not only in how their own funds 
are spent, but also over broader matters of development policy and political reform in the recipient 
country. They also value certain principles, such as inclusive political institutions. Recipient govern-
ments, on the other hand, may value donors’ technical competence, but are likely also to value political 
autonomy and discretion over public spending. Differences in preferences between donor agencies and 
recipient countries means that aid policy is always negotiated (Whitfield, 2009).
According to Swedlund (2017), negotiations between donor agencies and recipient countries are 
constrained by commitment problems, or an inability on the part of both donors and recipients to make 
credible promises and/or threats. While donors and recipients may have a strong incentive to strike a 
bargain, there is always the potential for compliance to be a problem. When parties engage with this 
ex post problem ex ante, the parties will attempt to alter the incentives by devising institutions that 
promote compliance with negotiated agreements (North & Weingast, 1989; North, 1990). Results-
based aid is a good example. The approach tries to incentivize recipients to fulfil their commitments 
by disbursing grants or loans in response to the achievement of predefined results, such as the number 
of children who pass the national secondary-school exam or are vaccinated (Janus & Keijzer, 2015).
3.1 | A model of aid policy bargaining
How might a bargaining framework be applied to help explain the rise and fall of general budget sup-
port? Below we use a simple and analytically parsimonious Nash bargaining model to formalize the 
predictions of a bargaining framework. In the model, donors and recipients haggle over the volume of 
aid transfers, the extent to which public spending conforms to the donors’ policy preferences, and how 
much pressure the donors put on the recipient government to be politically inclusive. A constraint in 
the form of donor commitment problems is introduced to these negotiations.
The Nash bargaining framework is the simplest possible set-up that can be used to generate testable 
predictions about the impact of commitment problems on aid policy bargaining. It abstracts from in-
tertemporal choices and from the macroeconomic effects that aid flows and government expenditure 
decisions may have on future fiscal revenue. This level of abstraction is advantageous, because it 
makes it possible to analyse the political consequences of commitment problems within a country in 
isolation from their impact on macroeconomic and global phenomena.
In the bargaining model, the donor agency’s preferences are characterized by the utility function 
ud(A, C, D), where A stands for the volume of aid transfers, C is a parameter that captures how much 
donors pressure the government to be politically inclusive, and D stands for the amount of public 
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spending that conforms to the policy preferences of donors in the recipient country’s budget. Donor 
agencies prefer to achieve the same policy outcomes with less aid. For both normative and strategic 
reasons, donors prefer to be able to exert pressure on governments to be politically inclusive. Thus, ud 
is decreasing in A and increasing in C and D.
The recipient government’s preferences are captured by the utility function ug(X, C, D), where 
X stands for discretionary spending. Discretionary spending is any public spending that is not con-
trolled by the donor’s policy preferences, including for example military spending or the creation of 
patronage jobs. The government always prefers to be able to spend more money, regardless of whether 
the spending is discretionary or earmarked for purposes that conform to the donors’ objectives. To 
maximize political autonomy, the government prefers donors to minimize the pressures they exert to 
increase political inclusivity. Thus, ug is decreasing in C and increasing in X and D.
We distinguish between government spending that conforms to the donors’ policy preferences 
D and discretionary spending X because of aid fungibility. Because aid is fungible, an increase in 
aid flows A does not automatically result in an equivalent increase in development spending that 
conforms to the donor’s policy preferences. For example, expenditures on a small-enterprise devel-
opment programme may serve a purpose that a donor agency finds worthwhile. However, the pro-
gramme may be deliberately aimed at the government’s political constituents, reducing its efficiency. 
In such a case, the government expenditure for the programme could not be subsumed under D in its 
entirety; the efficiency loss from aiming it at beneficiaries of government clientelism would have to 
be accounted for as discretionary government spending X. Therefore, for the sake of the model, we 
assume that any public expenditure can be classified by how much it contributes to each category.
From the government’s perspective, expenditures must satisfy the budget constraint, leading to the 
budget equation, B0 + qA = D + X, where the revenue side comprises the government’s own fiscal 
revenue B0 and aid flows A. The parameter q ∈ [0,1] captures a factor by which the recipient govern-
ment discounts promised foreign aid in its expenditure planning. Thus, q reflects the extent of donor 
commitment problems. For example, fiscal planners in Uganda work with a specific discount factor on 
aid commitments in their internal calculations. To account for the differences between disbursements 
and commitments, the government discounts all aid projections by an average of 30%–40% when 
preparing its annual budget (personal communication, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development, Uganda). In other cases, q is hypothetical. A value of q that is close to one indicates 
high credibility of donor commitments, meaning that the recipient government anticipates that most 
promised aid will materialize within the next budget cycle. A value of q that is close to zero indicates 
low credibility of donor commitments.
From a fiscal planning perspective, discretionary government spending is constrained to X = B0 + 
qA − D. Therefore, donors and the recipient government bargain over the amount of aid commitments 
A, the amount of development spending D, and the extent C to which donors pressure governments to 
be more politically inclusive. In the Nash bargaining framework, this means that donors and govern-
ments jointly solve the optimization problem:
where ūd and ūg represent their respective threat points. An efficient bargaining solution is an aid policy 
compromise (A*,C*,D*) that satisfies the first- and second-order conditions of the optimization problem. 
If a proposed aid policy compromise falls below a donor’s threat point, the donor agency would prefer to 
allocate its aid more efficiently in the next-best country in their portfolio. If a proposed aid policy com-




(ud − ūd) (ug− ūg)
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3.2 | Comparative statics
This model set-up helps us to examine how the extent of donor commitment problems q affects the aid 
policy compromise (A*,C*,D*) adopted in equilibrium. Changes in q should be interpreted as changes 
in the institutional environment within which donor–government bargaining takes place. In particular, 
q would increase if a new aid modality like budget support is introduced, and is perceived as reducing 
donor commitment problems. In order to assess the impact of such changes, the first-order conditions 
of the co-operative bargaining problem are obtained, and the implicit function theorem is used to 
evaluate how changes in q affect donor influence D and how much donors pressure governments to 
be politically inclusive C.
The comparative statics are based on three assumptions. First, an interior bargaining solution 
(A*,C*,D*) exists at which the second-order conditions are satisfied. This is not a substantive restric-
tion, because the model’s purpose is to explain how aid policy bargaining compromises change in re-
sponse to a decline in donor commitment problems, not the conditions under which donor–government 
relations break down beyond repair. Empirically, such cases are rare and would require an extension 
of the model. Second, the cross derivative of the recipient government’s utility function with respect 
to X and D is nonnegative: ug
XD
≥0. This rules out the perverse case that the government’s marginal 
utility from discretionary spending is decreasing in the amount of government spending that conforms 
to the donor’s preferences.2 Third, the cross derivative of the recipient government’s utility function 
with respect to X and C satisfies
That is, the marginal utility of discretionary government spending substantially falls as donors 
exert more pressure over recipients to be politically inclusive, i.e. if donors empower civil society, 
governments may face greater political constraints in their use of public resources or greater fiscal 
accountability pressures. With these assumptions in mind, the comparative statics (see Appendix 1) 
led to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: An increase in q leads to an increase in D*. Or, an increase in the ability 
of donor agencies to commit credibly leads to an increase in government spending that 
conforms to the donors’ policy preferences.
Proposition 2: An increase in q leads to a decrease in C*. Or, an increase in the ability 
of donor agencies to commit credibly leads donor agencies to reduce pressure on the 
recipient government to be politically inclusive.
 2From the government’s perspective, development and discretionary spending should be thought of as complements. The 
more money is spent according to donor preferences, the greater the political return the government will be able to derive 
from additional expenditures over which the donor has no say. For example, a government prestige project may become more 
popular if, at the same time, necessary investments in infrastructure and public service delivery are also made. Similarly, if a 
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3.3 | Observable implications
What are the practical implications of the model, as applied to budget support? First, consistent with 
Swedlund (2017), the model assumes that donor commitment problems constrain the bargaining com-
promises between donor agencies and recipient governments. For this to be justifiable, at the recip-
ient-country level we should see evidence that donor commitment problems not only exist but that 
recipient governments perceive them to be a problem. This means that we should be able to observe 
a palpable frustration with the inability of donor agencies to predict future aid disbursements, as well 
as with their tendency to move the goalposts. Such frustrations should be observable not only from 
government stakeholders but also from donor officials, who should be well aware of the challenges 
that donor commitment problems pose for recipients.
Second, the model predicts that recipient governments will be willing to provide donor agencies 
with more policy influence in exchange for more credible commitments. As applied to budget sup-
port, this means we should see evidence that budget support is justified in part because it is presented 
as making aid promises more credible and that—in exchange for providing budget support—donors 
obtain greater access to high-level decision-makers and more influence over domestic policy deci-
sion-making. Recipient governments should strategically rescind these advantages if donors cannot 
provide budget support as promised.
Third, the model predicts that, in exchange for more policy influence, donors providing budget 
support will be willing to exert less pressure on recipient governments to be politically inclusive. 
Rather than pressing for pluralism and democratic decision-making, we should observe that budget 
support donors (at least tacitly) accept the centralization of decision-making on the government 
side, while recipient governments, in turn, spend more money in line with donor preferences. If 
donors can no longer credibly commit to providing budget support, however, they lose their access 
and policy influence over government spending and will resume pressure on the government to be 
politically inclusive. Importantly, this prediction is limited to donor efforts to increase political 
inclusiveness. The model predicts that donors become less likely to pressure for political inclu-
siveness if they are afforded greater access and influence over government policy. Independent of 
that, political inclusiveness can vary between country contexts or change over time for exogenous 
reasons.
4 |  BUDGET SUPPORT IN RWANDA AND TANZANIA
In this section, we test the implications of the model using case-study evidence from Rwanda and 
Tanzania. A case-study approach allows us to engage in process-tracing, examining the shift towards 
and away from budget support and how it affected the bargaining compromises reached by donors 
and the government. Variation across the two cases over time allows us to evaluate how the adoption 
and abandonment of budget support altered donor–government relations in each country. Differences 
in the adoption of budget support across otherwise very similar donors in the same country context 
makes it possible to assess whether the predictions resulted from changes in donor practices or some-
thing else. The latter also provides qualitative insight into donors’ motivations when deciding to adopt 
budget support and helps clarify the direction of causality.
Both Rwanda and Tanzania received large amounts of budget support during the aid modality’s 
heyday. Between 2000 and 2011, budget support constituted, on average, over 27% of public expen-
diture in Rwanda and close to 18% in Tanzania (Swedlund, 2013b, p. 362). In terms of total volume, 
between 2005 and 2010, Tanzania received the highest amount of budget support of any low-income 
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country. Given its smaller economy, Rwanda received less budget support, but was still one of the top 
five recipients of budget support worldwide during the same time period (OECD, 2011).
The two cases are quite different, however, in other respects likely to influence donor–govern-
ment relations. Tanzania is a large, populous economy with an increasingly autonomous productive 
base thanks to discoveries of natural gas. On the other hand, Rwanda is a small, landlocked country 
whose economic base was decimated in the early 1990s by civil war and genocide. Despite remarkable 
growth since the 1990s, Rwanda remains much more aid-dependent than Tanzania.
Points of contention with donors also vary. In Rwanda, allegations of government support to militia 
groups in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) frequently strain donor–government 
relations (Swedlund, 2013a). In 2012, a United Nations report criticizing the Rwandan government for 
unlawful activities in the DRC led to the suspension of budget support (and military aid) to Rwanda 
(Desrosiers & Swedlund, 2019). On the other hand, Tanzania is routinely criticized by the international 
community for its inability (or unwillingness) to curb corruption. In late 2014, donors suspended bud-
get support to Tanzania following allegations of corruption in the energy sector (Anderson, 2014).
To understand the rise and fall of budget support in both countries, more than 80 semi-structured 
interviews with key decision-makers involved in aid policy bargaining in Rwanda and Tanzania were 
conducted between 2009 and 2013. In total, 49 interviews with policy-makers in Rwanda over three 
research periods and 34 interviews with policy-makers in Tanzania over two research periods were 
conducted (see Appendix 2 for a list of interviews). Respondents were selected through snowball 
sampling based on the need to cross-check and verify new pieces of information. In each country, we 
spoke with senior government officials and key technical staff; high-level representatives of multi-
lateral and bilateral donor agencies; and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives and 
independent consultants working on aid co-ordination and donor–government relations.
To triangulate the interview data, a survey of Heads of Co-operation (HoCs) was also adminis-
tered. The survey asked a number of questions about aid predictability and donor–government rela-
tions.3 Moreover, hundreds of primary documents were collected, including strategic documents and 
declarations by the government and donors; meeting agendas, presentations and minutes; and docu-
ments specific to identified programmes of interest. Finally, monitoring and evaluation reports and 
external assessments were consulted to verify observations and findings from the interviews (see 
Swedlund, 2017, for a more extended discussion of the methods).
4.1 | Evidence of donor commitment problems
A core assumption of the model is that donor commitment problems constrain the bargaining com-
promises reached by donor agencies and recipient governments. Is there, however, enough empirical 
evidence to justify this assumption? And, is there evidence that budget support was adopted on the 
assumption that it would reduce donor commitment problems?
When asked about government frustrations with donors, the inability of donors to make credible 
commitments was frequently the first, and often the only, frustration mentioned.4 At the same time, 
respondents in the two countries justified budget support by emphasizing that the aid modality was 
designed to improve the credibility of donors’ commitments by improving aid predictability and 
 3The HoC is the person responsible for a specific donor agency’s development co-operation in a given recipient country. The 
survey was also administered in 18 other countries in Africa. For more information, please contact the corresponding author.
 4The other frustration frequently noted by respondents was donor interference.
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preventing donors from “moving the goalposts”; i.e. changing the criteria for aid disbursement after 
the government and donors had reached an agreement.
In interviews, respondents frequently mentioned unpredictability and delays in disbursement. A 
senior Tanzanian government official explained that, “if the money doesn’t come, the government 
is in trouble” (personal communication, senior government official, Tanzania, October 29, 2013). 
Another noted that, “one of the challenges we faced for many years was [aid] predictability” (personal 
communication, senior government official, Tanzania, October 29, 2013). When asked in a question-
naire how difficult it is for their agency to give accurate predictions of aid one year in advance, six out 
of nine heads of development co-operation in Rwanda reported that it was either moderately or very 
difficult to do; and five out of eight reported the same in Tanzania. When asked how difficult it is for 
their agency to give accurate predictions three years in advance, all respondents replied that it was 
moderately or very difficult.
With regards to budget support in particular, respondents repeatedly emphasized that recipient 
governments favoured the aid modality because it was designed to improve predictability by disburs-
ing aid in front-loaded tranches and by making explicit in advance what is required for funds to be 
released. A donor representative claimed, for example, that budget support means that you “don’t have 
all these approval and objection processes and procurement” (personal communication, multilateral 
donor official, Tanzania, June 20, 2012), that can make other types of aid unpredictable. Similarly, a 
widely cited report on budget support to Tanzania claims that budget support would have been 20%–
25% less predictable, if it had been distributed via projects and basket funds (Lawson et al., 2013).
Respondents also repeatedly complained that donor agencies constantly “move the goalposts.” A 
leading Tanzanian economist noted, for example, that the most frustrating thing for the government 
Box 1 Budget support and donor influence
For donors directly it’s the level of influence we have … We’re sitting at the 
top table in the country and we get to help … We have the ear of the Minister 
of Finance, and we have the ear of the planning people, and we can influence 
the direction the government is heading to some extent at the highest levels. 
(Personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, July 7, 2012)
While if you and I, representing a donor, we go to the Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and we agree to build a road, they’re very happy, but that’s fine. And if we 
go to Ministry of Finance and we give 500 million dollars cash and we ask for 
something, normally we get it. 
(Personal communication, multilateral donor official, Tanzania, May 29, 2012)
The reason why most of us are giving general budget support is because we 
do have our own thoughts on how policy reforms should look … to be able 
to have some kind of influence via dialogue … if we didn’t have that agenda, 
we would not be giving budget support. 
(Personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, October 28, 
2013)
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is unpredictable changes in donor policies (personal communication, aid scholar and consultant, 
Tanzania, June 27, 2012). As a respondent explained, this makes it hard for recipient governments to 
“steer a stable course” (personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, May 23, 2012). 
Respondents reported that they initially saw budget support as a way to set the goalposts firmly in 
place. When a donor decides to engage in budget support, they commit to funding the country’s na-
tional development plan and disbursing according to a single, common framework; i.e. they commit 
to a specific development trajectory and a set of shared priorities. In both countries, budget support 
donors based their decision to disburse funds on a set of mutually agreed indicators. While still de-
manding a great deal from the government, these performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) re-
quired donor agencies to choose and make explicit disbursement criteria. As a respondent explained, 
the main benefit of budget support for the government is that they get the views of all donors in 
one document, and there should be “no change of plan” (personal communication, GBS Secretariat, 
Tanzania, June 20, 2012).
What donors and recipients underestimated, however, is how politically vulnerable the aid modal-
ity was. General budget support was eventually suspended in both Rwanda and Tanzania in response 
to specific events and concerns. In Tanzania, the concerns were mainly about the mismanagement of 
funds, while in Rwanda it was mainly about human rights and Rwandan incursions into neighbouring 
DRC. However, before the official suspension, budget support was already on the decline in both 
countries (Keijzer et al., 2020), as well as in several other countries. This suggests that the decline in 
budget support in Rwanda and Tanzania was part of a larger retreat from the aid modality.
According to respondents, the retreat from budget support came about not because donor officials 
stopped believing in it, but because exogenous factors made it difficult for them to convince their 
own governments back home. One respondent, for example, noted that, “politically, there’s a pull 
back on the part of our government, […] which I think is wrong … I think we need to give it longer, 
we need to not abandon the process at this point” (personal communication, bilateral donor official, 
Tanzania, July 4, 2012). In particular, the 2008 global financial crisis resulted in declining aid budgets 
in many European countries. At the same time, more conservative governments less favourable to bud-
get support and aid in general were elected in many donor countries, undermining the ability of donor 
agencies to make credible promises to providing budget support. As one respondent explained, in the 
future they may not be able to give GBS, “not because we have negative experience or a negative eval-
uation, but simply because there are other priorities at home that are higher than the GBS” (personal 
communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, June 20, 2012). In other words, donor agencies 
could no longer make a credible commitment to delivering budget support as promised.
The retreat from budget support caused a great deal of frustration among recipient-government 
officials. The Rwandan Central Bank governor, Claver Gatete, was quoted in The Economist as saying 
that the suspension of funds already promised is a “gross betrayal” (The pain of suspension, 2013). 
Recipient-government officials, however, lack the ability to enforce donor commitments, and rely 
mainly on shaming techniques to pressure donors into honouring their promises. Donor officials re-
ported being sensitive to such pressures, but donors are ultimately accountable to domestic taxpayers 
and politicians, not to beneficiaries in aid-recipient countries (Martens, 2002).
4.2 | Donor influence
The model outlined in Section 3 predicts that recipient governments will be willing to give donor 
agencies greater policy influence in exchange for more credible commitments. If this prediction is 
valid, we should see evidence that donors saw the aid modality as a way for them to exercise more (not 
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less) influence over domestic policy processes. When the aid modality broke down in both countries 
in the late 2000s, such influence should be reduced.
When asked directly, “In your opinion, do donors providing budget support have more influence 
with the [Government of Rwanda/Tanzania]?,” 15 of 17 heads of development co-operation answered 
yes. And, when asked about the advantages of budget support to donors, both recipient and donor 
representatives mentioned influence more than any other advantage—including recipient-country 
ownership (see Box 1).
In both countries, donor and government officials stated explicitly that budget support gives donor 
agencies greater access to government, allowing them “to influence a much larger set of resources” 
(personal communication, senior government official, Tanzania, October 30, 2013). For example, 
a Rwandan respondent told me that budget support allows donor agencies to have discussions at a 
higher level and to access privileged information (personal communication, multilateral donor offi-
cial, Rwanda, June 29, 2009). A Tanzanian respondent emphasized that what makes budget support 
attractive is “the fact that you are part of them, part of their business” (personal communication, 
bilateral donor official, Tanzania, October 28, 2013). As another respondent explained, when a donor 
provides budget support, they get to ask the big questions, like what is the impact of all of your poverty 
programmes? As a result, donors providing budget support get more information than other donors, 
can check that their resources are being used well, and can influence policy (personal communication, 
multilateral donor official, Rwanda, November 2009).
Importantly, donor officials working for agencies that do not provide budget support were also 
very aware of the privileged position given to those which do. A Rwandan respondent, for example, 
Box 2 Budget support and political inclusivity
Especially in the GBS part of the annual dialogue, you see … government 
talking to development partners. So actually it’s accountability of government 
to its development partners … most of us want, first of all government to be 
accountable to its Parliament, to its own population, to NGOs here. But … for 
the moment this is how it works … 
(Personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, March 23, 2012)
The GBS annual review, in the last years, became kind of a bilateral discus-
sion between the government and the donors. The government was saying 
that GBS contracts were contracts between the government and the donors. 
So, as it was a contractual issue, all those stakeholders were not able to par-
ticipate. Which can be questionable. 
(Personal communication, bilateral donor official, June 7, 2012)
In the policy dialogue on macroeconomic policies, the role of civil society is 
very limited … We have a system, we have macro policies which we apply to 
all our dialogues with everybody… 
(Personal communication, multilateral donor official, Tanzania, May 29, 
2012)
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lamented their inability to give budget support (personal communication, bilateral donor officials, 
Rwanda, June, 17 and 24, 2010), while another said that, because they did not provide general budget 
support, the government liked to make them feel they were not a part of things. The latter went on to 
explain that when you are a budget support donor there is a need to discuss everything. As a result, you 
get access to everything (personal communication, bilateral donor official, Rwanda, June 17, 2010).
Given the heightened access that budget support afforded donors, many of the donor officials we 
spoke to regretted their country’s decision to retreat from budget support in the late 2000s, as it af-
fected the access that donor officials on the ground were granted. Following the suspension of budget 
support, both the Rwandan and Tanzanian governments stopped being willing to meet with donors 
through special forums set up to support the aid modality. The Rwanda government, in particular, 
made it clear that it was not willing to meet in an exclusive dialogue without receiving aid via budget 
support (personal communication, bilateral and multilateral donor officials, Rwanda, October 14 and 
15, 2013). Following the suspension in Tanzania, the government began refusing to meet with donors 
in multilateral settings, arguing that these forums gave donors too many opportunities to “gang up” on 
the government. As a government official in Tanzania explained, donors cannot suspend budget sup-
port and “expect continual engagement with the government” (personal communication, government 
official, Tanzania, October 24, 2013).
4.3 | Political Inclusivity
Finally, the model predicts that, if granted more influence over domestic decision-making, donor 
agencies will be willing to exert less pressure on recipient governments to be politically inclusive. 
As applied to budget support, this means that—in exchange for access and influence—donors should 
reduce pressures on the government to be more inclusive, tacitly accepting the centralization of 
decision-making.
In both Rwanda and Tanzania, budget support empowered the ministry of finance, and it was dif-
ficult for civil society and other domestic groups to engage with the processes set up to co-ordinate 
and manage budget support. Further, in both countries, donor representatives made clear that donor 
agencies were aware of the limited space for civil society within these frameworks, but accepted it as 
a cost of the aid modality. Under project aid, donor agencies work with a variety of domestic stake-
holders from sector ministries to local governments to civil society organizations (CSOs). In contrast, 
if donors channel money through national systems, the ministry of finance becomes the sole custodian 
of aid. As the controller of the purse, the ministries of finance in both countries benefitted from the 
shift towards budget support, and it is the leadership from this ministry that advocated most strongly 
for it. (In contrast, sector line ministries complained about being left out.) When explaining how the 
negotiation of their country programme affects power dynamics, one donor representative explained 
that the process empowered the Tanzanian External Finance Commissioner, because all sectors had 
to go through him; he became the gatekeeper (personal communication, multilateral donor official, 
Tanzania, June 21, 2012).
In both Tanzania and Rwanda, membership in the budget support working group was limited to 
donor and government representatives and discussions took place behind closed doors. According to 
one donor official, these restrictions had the benefit of “keeping the numbers down, so it [was] more 
possible to have a discussion” (personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, June 5, 
2012). The costs to broader participation did not, however, go unnoticed by donor officials (see Box 
2). In Tanzania, for example, the government actively sought to separate the dialogue on budget sup-
port from broader policy dialogues. Respondents justified this exclusion by noting that it allowed them 
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to focus on a narrow set of “core general budget support” issues like the budget and financial man-
agement (personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, June 7, 2012). On these issues 
at least, broad participation was not a donor priority. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that a civil 
society representative in Rwanda emphasized that, “budget support leaves civil society vulnerable” 
(personal communication, civil society representative, Rwanda, June 3, 2010).
Proponents of budget support frequently argue that the aid modality increases domestic account-
ability, because donor funds face the same domestic scrutiny as domestic revenues. However, the de-
gree to which domestic scrutiny is feasible depends on the strength of domestic institutions and on how 
well local stakeholders can organize themselves in the current political climate. In Rwanda, in partic-
ular, several respondents expressed discomfort with efforts to organize CSOs around the aid effective-
ness agenda. For example, one interviewee suggested that these efforts represented an attempt to make 
civil society a part of government, recounting a popular joke that NGO stands for “next government 
official” (personal communication, bilateral donor representative, Rwanda, November 10, 2009). If 
indeed this is the objective of the aid-recipient government, then budget support does little to prevent it:
depending on whether the government is a democratic government, a representative gov-
ernment, you put a lot of money into the central government, so you can strengthen. If 
there is a central government that is not so credible, and not really anchored or account-
able and transparent, they’re sort of supporting a system that can be a bit questionable. 
(Personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, June 20, 2012)
Another respondent put it more cynically, joking that budget support works best in dictatorships (per-
sonal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, June 3, 2012).
Following the decline in budget support, a much more antagonistic relationship between donors 
and government emerged in both Rwanda and Tanzania. While donor officials still saw the value 
of working with recipient-government officials, they became more likely to draw on a wider set of 
domestic actors, including civil society, the media and parliamentarians to push for reforms. In other 
words, they became more likely to advocate for more inclusive political institutions. For their part, 
following the suspension of budget support, recipients became much less willing to accede to donor 
demands and wishes, and where possible sought out financing from “new” donors like China and 
India. Both Rwanda and Tanzania have also increasingly pushed back at donors. In 2016, the Tanzania 
government, for example, hired a set of consultants to devise a mechanism that would prevent donors 
from withdrawing pledged funds (Kidanka, 2016).
5 |  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Budget support is the aid modality most commonly associated with country ownership. Yet, scholars 
and practitioners have repeatedly questioned whether the approach really provides more control for 
recipient countries, noting that the aid modality seems to give donors unprecedented access and influ-
ence at the recipient-country level. Was budget support simply a guise for increasing donor influence 
in recipient countries? How can we explain the rapid shift towards budget support, as well as the rapid 
decline in its popularity after only a few short years?
Contrary to explanations that suggest that budget support was a normative decision by donors de-
signed to increase aid effectiveness, a bargaining framework emphasizes that aid policy is the result of 
sustained negotiations between donor agencies and recipient countries. In this article, we formalized 
the predictions of a bargaining framework in which donors and recipients bargain over three things: 
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the volume of aid transfers, the extent to which public spending conforms to the donors’ policy pref-
erences, and how inclusive the policy dialogue is. Following Swedlund (2017), the model includes a 
parameter that captures the extent of donor commitment problems.
From the model, two testable predictions emerged: (1) in exchange for more credible commitments, 
recipient governments are willing to selectively offer donor agencies greater access and influence over 
domestic policy decision-making; and (2) in exchange for such influence, donor agencies are willing 
to exert less pressure on recipient governments to be politically inclusive. We then evaluated the 
saliency of the model and its predictions through case-study evidence from Rwanda and Tanzania. 
Interviews with over 80 key decision-makers in both countries validated the key assumptions and 
predictions of the model.
Applied to budget support and the debates on ownership, the article challenges the assertion that 
budget support was merely a normative decision by donors designed to improve aid effectiveness. 
The findings suggest that budget support was only really feasible because of a negotiated compromise 
between donor agencies and recipient governments. When donors could no longer provide budget 
support as promised, this compromise broke down.
More generally, the article illustrates the value of a bargaining approach to foreign aid. At the re-
cipient-country level, donor agencies and recipient governments continually bargain over development 
policy. Rather than assuming that aid policy is entirely donor driven, we need to pay attention to what 
donors and recipients bargain and negotiate over, and the constraints they face in these negotiations. The 
bargaining framework presented and formalized in this article provides a way to understand these ne-
gotiations and their implications for the types of policy and practices that are pursued. In the future, the 
model could be extended in a number of ways to account for variations between individual donors and 
recipient countries, as well as additional preferences and constraints. In this way, the model is a starting 
point for future research that aims to take bargaining and negotiation in foreign aid more seriously.
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APPENDIX 1
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Substituting X = B0 + qA − D (from the government budget equation) into the recipient govern-
ment’s utility function ug(D,C,X), the first-order conditions for the Nash bargaining solution are given 
by
We are interested in the comparative static ∂D*/∂q. This relationship is implicitly defined by equa-
tion (3). Define RDq as the derivative of the left-hand side of equation (3) with respect to q. Define 
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By Assumption 1, the second-order conditions are satisfied, which implies that RDD < 0.
Moreover, under Assumptions 1 and 2, we can identify the sign of RDq
Note that by definition A ≥ 0, ug
X
> 0, udD > 0 and ugXX < 0. By Assumption 1, an interior solution 




> 0. By Assumption 2, ug
XD
> 0. It follows that, RDq > 0.
Therefore, since under Assumptions 1-2 RDq > 0 and R
D
D < 0, it follows from the implicit function 
theorem that ∂D*/∂q > 0. This means that in the efficient aid policy bargaining solution, a greater 
ability of donors to make credible aid commitments should, ceteris paribus, be associated with greater 
donor influence over policy decisions in the recipient country.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
In Proposition 2, we are interested in the comparative static ∂C*/∂q. Similar to the proof of 
Proposition 1, this relationship can be recovered by the implicit function theorem from equation (2). 
Define RCq as the derivative of the left-hand side of equation (2) with respect to q. Define R
C C as the 
derivative of the left-hand side of equation (2) with respect to C. It follows that
By Assumption 1, we must have RC C < 0, for the second-order conditions to hold. R
C
q is given by
By definition, A ≥ 0. ug
X
> 0 and udC > 0. By Assumption 1, an interior solution exists, so that (ud 
− ūd) > 0. By Assumption 3,




  Month-Year Organization Name
1 Oct-2009 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
2 Oct-2009 US Agency for International Development (USAID)
3 Oct-2009 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
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5 Oct-2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
6 Oct-2009 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
7 Nov-2009 Norwegian People’s Aid 8
8 Nov-2009 Search for Common Ground
9 Nov-2009 Rwandan Governance Advisory Council
10 Nov-2009 European Commission
11 Nov-2009 UK Department of International Development (DFID)
12 Nov-2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/Rwanda National Parliament
13 Nov-2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
14 Nov-2009 Rwanda Governance Advisory Council
15 Nov-2009 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
16 Nov-2009 Ministry for Local Government (MINALOC)
17 Nov-2009 European Commission
18 Nov-2009 US Agency for International Development (USAID)
19 Nov-2009 African Development Bank (AfDB)
20 Nov-2009 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
21 Nov-2009 World Bank
22 Nov-2009 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
23 June-2010 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
24 June-2010 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
25 June-2010 Rwanda Civil Society Platform
26 June-2010 Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP)
27 June-2010 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
28 June-2010 Rwanda Governance Advisory Council
29 June-2010 Rwanda Governance Advisory Council
30 June-2010 US Agency for International Development (USAID)
31 June-2010 World Bank
32 June-2010 UK Department for International Development (DFID)
33 June-2010 United National Development Programme (UNDP)
34 June-2010 Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy, Rwanda
35 June-2010 Embassy of Belgium, Rwanda
36 June-2010 ActionAid
37 June-2010 Independent Consultant
38 June-2010 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
39 June-2010 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
40 June-2010 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
41 June-2010 Norwegian People’s Aid
42 June-2010 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
43 July-2010 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
44 July-2010 Trocaire
45 July-2010 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
46 Oct-2013 European Commission
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47 Oct-2013 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
48 Oct-2013 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)
49 Oct-2013 Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy, Rwanda
Tanzania
1 May-2012 Development Partners Group (DPG)
2 May-2012 Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy, Tanzania
3 May-2012 Embassy of Denmark, Tanzania
4 May-2012 Foundation for Civil Society
5 May-2012 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
6 May-2012 Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ)
7 May-2012 European Commission
8 June-2012 GBS Secretariat
9 June-2012 Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy, Tanzania
10 June-2012 Irish Aid
11 June-2012 Planning Commission. President’s Office
12 June-2012 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
13 June-2012 US Agency for International Development (USAID)
14 June-2012 Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ)
15 June-2012 The World Bank
16 June-2012 GBS Secretariat
17 June-2012 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
18 June-2012 African Development Bank
19 June-2012 Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)
20 June-2012 World Bank
21 June-2012 Policy Forum
22 June-2012 Independent Consultant—Economic and Social Research Foundation
23 June-2012 Research on Poverty Alleviation, REPOA
24 June-2012 Ministry of Finance, External Finance Unit and MKUKUTA Department
25 July-2012 Japanese Embassy, Tanzania
26 July-2012 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
27 July-2012 UK Department for International Development (DFID)
28 Oct-2013 Planning Commission, President’s Office
29 Oct-2013 Ministry of Finance, External Finance Unit
30 Oct-2013 UK Department for International Development (DFID)
31 Oct-2013 Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO)
32 Oct-2013 Embassy of the Republic of Germany, Tanzania
33 Oct-2013 Bank of Tanzania
34 Oct-2013 European Commission
